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We live with the legacy of injustice, political as well as personal. Even if our governments 
are now democratically elected and governed, our societies are scarred by forms of power 
and privilege accrued from a time in which people’s race, sex, class and religion were 
grounds for denying them a role in government, or in the selection of those who governed 
them.  
 What does that past imply for the treatment of religion in democratic states? The 
problem is particularly pressing once one accepts that religious freedom is not just a matter of 
individuals’ freedom of conscience and worship, but of people’s claims to associate with 
others through institutions whose powers, status and commitment to equality are very 
different (Laborde, 2015). If this means that churches pose some of the same philosophical 
and practical problems as families, from a democratic perspective, the fact that churches have 
no obvious point or justification, beyond being the repository of the claims to conscience of 
their members, appears to distinguish them from the former. In principle, this should make it 
easier to think about the claims of government, as compared to those of churches.  In 
practice, however, it may simply bring into sharper focus philosophical and political 
challenges to equality that contemporary democracies now face.   
 Take, for instance, the question of whether Catholic adoption agencies should be 
required to serve gay couples because they are willing to serve non-Catholics? Or consider 
the question whether Catholic hospitals should be required to provide contraceptives to those 
who want them? Such questions lie at the heart of contemporary controversy, in Britain and 
the USA, over the appropriate scope for conscientious exemptions from antidiscrimination 
law, and over the implications of allowing voluntary associations a role in the provision of 
public goods and services. Freedom of conscience requires that faith-based institutions be 
free to serve their members’ needs in accordance with their religious teachings. But what 
should happen when faith-based institutions serve the general public, often with public 
funds? 
 There are two logically coherent but opposed answers to these questions: ‘conscience 
trumps all’ and ‘equality trumps all’. Cardinal Timothy Dolan, Roman Catholic Archbishop 
of New York and President of the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, represents the first 
position, and the British Humanist Association represents the second. Both illuminate the 
complexities of the issues, and their limitations – or so I will argue – highlight the scope for 
political choice in morally acceptable responses to such questions. This is partly because 
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states have duties to rectify injustices inherited from the past, even if this means depriving 
religious associations of the role in public service-provision which they have held, hitherto. 
Partly, however, difficulties arise in drawing the public/private distinction in religious 
matters, because states have duties of sensitivity to the religious aspirations and needs of their 
members. States may therefore subsidise religious associations that provide appropriate 
public services for citizens, rather than trying to provide them themselves, or choosing a 
secular provider. However, state duties of equality, inclusion and care mean that there is 
relatively little room for conscientious exemptions from equality legislation in the provision 
of public services, regardless of how those services are funded – or so I will argue. 
The paper is structured as follows. First it casts a sceptical eye on Cardinal Dolan’s expansive 
interpretation of freedom of conscience, which would require the State to enforce religious 
norms of conduct on Church employees, by denying them access to otherwise mandatory 
health insurance, and would justify extensive departures from non-discrimination laws 
whenever religious associations chose to provide important goods and services to the general 
public.   It then turns to the claims of the British Humanist Association, and argues that while 
their substantive claims about state responsibility for the equality of citizens are generally 
persuasive, the normative assumptions behind their arguments are problematic.  Specifically, 
it challenges the BHA view that the provision of important goods and services by religious 
groups must be more divisive and sectarian than provision by non-religious groups, and that a 
commitment to the equality of citizens requires us to track existing differences between those 
who are religious and those who are not.  
Conscience vs. Equality? 
According to Cardinal Dolan, conscience is as much implicated in the way Catholic-affiliated 
hospitals treat non-Catholic employees and patients as it is in the way that the Catholic 
Church handles purely internal matters, such as the selection of priests, or ministry to 
parishioners.
1
 Consequently, he claims, religious exemptions from non-discrimination laws 
that apply to the Church’s treatment of the faithful must apply to its provision of services to 
the general public as well. Hence, he insists, if it is wrong to force the Catholic Church to 
make contraceptive and abortion care accessible to the faithful, it would be wrong to force it 
to provide insurance covering such care, even in the case of non-Catholics employees in 
Catholic schools and hospitals open to the general public. Similarly, Dolan maintains, if 
                                                          
1
 Cardinal Dolan, ‘ObamaCare and Religious Freedom’, Wall Street Journal (2012) available online at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203718504577178833194483196.html 
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adoption services are precluded from serving gay couples when they minister only to the 
faithful, they must be allowed to discriminate against gay couples when they serve the 
general public.  
 Cardinal Dolan maintains that it would be morally wrong for the state to require the 
Catholic Church to provide health insurance that covers abortion and contraception for its 
employees, whether Catholic or not. That is not obvious. While the state cannot require 
Churches to abide by the full set of non-discrimination norms when selecting personnel for 
religious ministry and posts such as ‘Sunday-school teacher’, it can legitimately regulate the 
relationship between Churches and employees engaged in non-specifically religious jobs, 
such as administrators, cooks, cleaners and drivers (Rosenblum, 1998: 73-111 and 2000: 165-
195). The state can ensure that they are hired without sexual or racial discrimination, and 
without invasions of their privacy – as would occur were they forced to describe their sexual 
status or preferences, their marital and procreative plans, or whether they have ever had, or 
might be willing to have, an abortion. In short, religious objections to abortion provide no 
justification for invading the privacy of employees, or of discriminating against female 
candidates for non-religious employment. It is therefore unclear why religious doctrine 
should entitle Churches to exempt themselves from forms of health-insurance which apply to 
other employers or how far democratic states could legitimately grant Churches exemptions 
that they were unwilling or unable to provide for individual believers.
2
 
 There are two puzzling features about Cardinal Dolan’s position, at least as concerns 
the right to abortion. The first, and most obvious, is that unless the Church wishes publicly to 
insist that even abortions necessary to save a mother’s life are murder, there is no justification 
for opposing all health insurance coverage of abortion. But the second puzzle is that Catholic 
priests and nuns are the people least likely to seek abortions in defiance of the Church’s 
teaching on the matter, so the reasons for the Church to seek exemptions from health-
insurance in their case, is weak. Weak or not, however, the Church can scarcely require the 
State to force employees to behave as Catholic teaching requires, by depriving them of legal 
access to healthcare; and as the Church’s non-religious employees have the same interests in 
                                                          
2
 Cardinal Dolan is keen to maintain that any employer with a conscientious objection to abortion should be able 
to get an exemption from Obama’s health insurance policies. He is indifferent to the problems of moral hazard 
which such a policy would generate because he is clearly willing to make any form of health insurance 
impracticable if that is necessary to prevent insurance for abortion. However, even setting aside that issue, it is 
unclear how the state could finance health insurance through employer mandates (the necessary alternative to a 
‘single payer system’ in the United States), on Dolan’s policy, even if employers did not lie about their 
conscience in order to avoid paying the full costs of insurance for their employees. 
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healthcare as employees working for other employers, it is hard to see what justification there 
is for granting the Church exemptions from healthcare insurance designed to protect the 
legitimate interests of employees.    
 Of course, what the state may require of Churches as employers does not 
automatically determine what it may require of Churches as providers of services to the 
public. What is at issue in cases such as that of the Catholic adoption agency, hospital or 
universities is not the conscience of employers in their relations with potentially vulnerable 
employees, but the conscience of some providers of public services to people who may have 
no particular ties to the Church. The challenge facing Cardinal Dolan’s position then, is to see 
how conscience could trump considerations of equality and, in particular, of non-
discrimination in the provision of public goods and services. Whatever the religious 
obligations that lead Churches to create or support religious schools, hospitals, old-age 
homes, nunneries and the like, it is implausible that religious obligations require them to 
provide goods and services for the general public, too. 
 No one has a conscientious obligation to provide goods and services to the general 
public for a fee, whatever their duties of charitable care to the poor and needy.
3
 It is one 
thing, then, to say that religious beliefs should determine religious care of the faithful, and 
quite another to say that they should determine the provision of non-profit goods and services 
for the general public, whether or not the state is subsidising those services. The state cannot 
reasonably object to adoption agencies that refuse to place children with homosexual couples, 
so long as the adoption agency serves only those who accept Church teaching on these 
matters, and there are suitable alternatives available for everyone else.
4
 However, in societies, 
such as our own, the ability to adopt is now difficult and highly valued by those who are 
unable to have children by other means. There are therefore good reasons why the State must 
ensure adequate access to non-discriminatory adoption agencies, if necessary by removing 
any subsidies it gives to agencies that discriminate on doctrinal grounds, and giving these to 
religious or secular bodies with more inclusive practices.    
                                                          
3
 A ‘calling’ or ‘vocation’ to serve the ‘heathen’ does not mean that one has a religious obligation to serve 
everyone without proselytising; nor is the charitable provision of care, as an expression of faith, the same as the 
provision of services such as education, health-care or adoption for money, albeit in ways that are designed to be 
‘not for profit’. 
4
 For the legal battle over the right of Catholic adoption agencies in the UK to discriminate against gay couples 
see http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2011/apr/26/catholic-adoption-agency-gay-lesbian and 
http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2012/09/13/uk-catholic-adoption-charity-resumes-anti-gay-legal-fight/ .   
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 Of course, it is likely that in at least some cases the reason why religious associations 
provide goods like education and health-care to the general public is because this helps to 
subsidise the provision of such goods to co-religionists (Rosenblum, 2000: 186). Catholic 
hospitals and universities, for instance, may now serve the general public as well as 
Catholics, because that is what was necessary to keep such expensive institutions going for 
the faithful. It might therefore seem as though I have tried to draw too strong a line between 
religious organisations that provide care or education to the faithful, and religious 
organisations serving the general public. If there is a conscientious duty to provide the 
former, practical concerns, it may seem, mean that this conscientious dimension constrains 
state regulation of the latter. However, states have no duties to ensure that religious people 
are able to fulfil their religious obligations, regardless of their cost (Jones, 2015 a, b), and 
democratic citizens may reasonably believe that it is a mark against a religion if its 
obligations can only be fulfilled by the wealthy or the fortunate. States therefore have no 
general obligation to subsidise the religious obligations of the faithful. Moreover, it is surely 
a complicated question, and one likely to vary from religion to religion (and from sect to 
sect), whether churches or their equivalents, have religious obligations to provide these goods 
for the faithful. Thus, even if it turns out that the reasons why a religious association provides 
goods and services to the general public is because this enables it to provide religiously 
appropriate care to the faithful, it is unclear that we are concerned with conscience-backed 
claims which might justify exemptions from otherwise justified laws.  
 Nonetheless, considerations of completeness, as well as of humanity, preclude leaving 
matters here. Even if it is true, as I’ve argued, that religious associations have no conscience-
based claim for exemption from healthcare insurance, and can properly be required to abide 
by generally applicable laws when they serve the general public, states can and, often, should 
be sensitive to the need of religious organisations to provide religiously-appropriate care for 
members who are old or ill. For example, religiously orthodox Jews are required by their 
religion to lead lives which are dictated in minute, and quite specific, ways by their faith. If 
they live in a society in which they are a small minority, as is likely, some specialised 
medical facilities and old-age care may be necessary for them to live as their religion dictates. 
Co-religionists may be able to provide these specialised facilities in sufficient quantity and 
quality to meet the standards of care required by law. However, given the likely expense and 
difficulty of providing such specialised care in most modern democracies, co-religionist may 
simply be unable to cope. In such circumstances, states may need to subsidise the provision 
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of religiously appropriate care by creating appropriate spaces, food and clothing options in its 
old age homes and hospitals or by contributing to the costs of old age homes run for the 
devout. Such subsidies are consistent with the claim that states have no general duty to help 
people to fulfil their religious obligations. It is an accident, from the state’s perspective, that 
citizens have different religious as well as secular convictions, which make ‘one size fits all’ 
unsuitable as a way to care for its members, once they are unable to care for themselves 
(Walzer, 1983, xi-xiii, 3-6). Hence, we can distinguish the role of religion in constituting 
legally required standards of care, from a general claim to state support for religion.  
 We have seen, then that ‘conscience’ does not automatically justify the different 
activities in which religious organisations are engaged. The fact that Churches now organise 
or administer activities, such as education or healthcare, does not mean that this is the 
religiously preferred, let alone obligatory, way to provide them. Conscientious exemptions, 
charitable status, subsidies and the like, if justified, are not the ‘corporate’ attributes of the 
Church, and should therefore be available to other people or organisations fulfilling that role, 
should they have comparable religious scruples. Governments may therefore prefer to 
provide those services themselves, through specialised state agencies, or to subsidise their 
provision by those who will not need exemptions from democratic forms of equality, 
whatever they are. However, States have duties to accommodate the religious needs of the 
sick and elderly, or to subsidise religiously appropriate care by non-state actors, because the 
old and sick do not need to hold majority beliefs in order to qualify for care, nor must they be 
willing to abandon essential elements of their faith in order to fit in.   
 The public/private line is not easy to draw, then, whether we look at it from the 
perspective of individual conscience, or the claims of religious associations. Nonetheless, 
equality and religious freedom are clearly inconsistent with Church exemptions from health-
insurance mandates that include abortion. The differences between spiritual and political 
dominion shape relations amongst the faithful, as well as between the faithful and the secular. 
The Church is therefore precluded from asking the state to enforce Catholic teaching, even on 
its religious employees, let alone on those who are not Catholic.   
Equality and State Duties 
By contrast with Cardinal Dolan, the British Humanist Association maintains that equality 
and non-discriminatory public services require religious agencies either to abide by the same 
antidiscrimination norms as the State, or stick to serving their co-religionists. Hence the 
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Society’s report, ‘Quality and Equality: Human Rights, Public Services and Religious 
Organisations’, concludes that ‘all organisations involved in the provision of statutory public 
services should be secular ones, but if religious ones are to be given contracts, they must 
operate in an inclusive, secular manner’.5 
 The appeal of this view is obvious. There are, after all, excellent reasons why people 
wanted the state to replace benevolent societies as the provider, not merely the funder, of 
unemployment benefits, old age pensions, aid for those in financial straits and the like (José 
Harris, 1977, and Ben Jackson, 2011). At one level, what people wanted was a public 
affirmation of their status and dignity even at those times – particularly at those times – when 
these felt most vulnerable, the hardest to sustain (Walzer: 82-91). Beyond that, people wanted 
the state to ensure fairness in the criteria for qualifying for those benefits, in order to ensure 
that those in need do not have to prove that they deserve to be helped. Hence the Report 
rejects the idea that homeless shelters and residential care homes should be provided by 
religious providers, because ‘in these circumstances the lack of choice – accept a service 
from the religious provider or go without – is, of course, problematic and objectionable’  
(BHA: 9).   
 Democratic concerns for the equality of citizens, as the BHA says, favour state 
provision of statutory public services and render religious provision acceptable only where 
religious associations abide by the norms of fairness, inclusiveness and equality applicable to 
the state. This is because any group or body that is acting in place of the state should have to 
abide by relevant norms appropriate to the state, just as those who act in place of parents need 
to abide by the relevant parental norms. However, it is important to distinguish the BHA’s 
conclusions on this matter from several problematic assumptions in the way that they present 
their case.   
 According to the BHA, the use of religious provision in public service is problematic 
in itself, when it comes to statutory public services although they have no objection to the 
state subsidising the religious (and discriminatory) provision of non-statutory services such as 
soup kitchens, drug rehabilitation facilities and the like, as long as these are seen as 
supplements to statutory provision (BHA: Section 4). The BHA believes that the use of 
                                                          
5
 ’Quality and Equality: Human Rights, Public Services and Religious Organisations’, a report of the British 
Humanist Association, available online at http://humanism.org.uk/campaigns/secularism/public-service-
reform/quality-and-equality-report/.  By ‘statutory public services’ the report to refer to ones that are actually 
mandated by law.  But the distinction between statutory and non-statutory services, so described, is normatively 
problematic. See Chiara Cordelli’s helpful way of describing the issue in Cordelli, 2012: 131-155.  
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religious bodies for statutory services is problematic in itself, even if there is no 
discrimination, no proselytising and the like, because religious organisations cannot 
‘represent the whole society’ (BHA: Appendix A). State use of religious providers for 
statutory goods, ‘By the very fact of giving religious groups that role, the government would 
be according them a special status. It would be making a statement about the nature of our 
society. It would be saying that religious groups can properly speak and act on behalf of the 
wider society. And those of us – the clear majority of the British population – who adhere to 
no institutionalised religion – that would be forcing us into an identity which we do not wish 
to inhabit’ (BHA: Appendix A and see also section 2.3). 
 This is puzzling. If a religious group provides a service – however important – in a 
way that is non-discriminatory, involves no proselytising and occurs in a neutral setting (as 
opposed, say, to a Church), it is hard to see why those receiving the service are being asked to 
adopt any particular identity at all. Indeed, it is unclear what identity people are asked to 
adopt in order to access unemployment insurance, or medical care in an NHS hospital beyond 
the identity of being an unemployed person or a sick one. The conditions for acquiring the 
benefit will involve proving that one is eligible to receive it – but that will be true whoever 
provides the service on behalf of the state. As, in any case, many of these benefits are not 
limited to citizens, it is unclear what forms of identification, if any, are implicit in the 
provision of even statutory public services. 
 Moreover, it is tendentious to assert that it is inherently more problematic for the non-
religious to receive statutory benefits from the religious (however ‘neutrally’ provided) than 
it is for the religious to receive them from a secular organisation (however ‘neutrally’ 
provided). It suggests that those of us with no religious beliefs must see all religious groups 
as ‘foreign’, potentially hostile and divisive, irrespective of the way that they behave, or how 
little we actually know about them. That seems to be the logic of the French ban on visible 
religious symbols, on the grounds that these are divisive, deliberately showy and a form of 
proselytising (Laborde, 2008: 31-55). But in Britain – rightly, in my view – we assume that 
women can represent other people whether or not they wear religious symbols, just as they 
can represent men, without looking, or living, like them. I am therefore sceptical that a 
commitment to equality requires us to favour secular over religious providers of public 
services, even in the case of statutory public services – though it will require all providers to 
act in ways that are non-discriminatory, respectful, sensitive to the needs and fears of service 
users, and to provide services in an environment that is suitably welcoming, accessible and 
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supportive. It would also require Catholic medical facilities that, for conscientious reasons, 
do not provide reproductive care such as abortion, to inform patients of alternative places 
where they could seek those services and to advise patients for whom this is medically 
appropriate, to seek such advice and care.  As we will see, the practical and symbolic 
dimensions of equality may sometimes require religious hospitals to team up with a facility 
that provides abortions, as long as the religious hospital wishes to provide maternity care.
6
   
Contextualising the Demands of Equality and the Claims of Conscience 
 Conscience is no justification for failing to inform patients of their legal rights, nor of 
the circumstances in which they might want to exercise them, although doctrinal limits on the 
range of medical services offered by a hospital are not, ipso facto more troubling for equality 
than limits set by geographical or historical traditions of specialisation. As with the latter, 
doctrinal limits on medical service are only acceptable if they do not compromise patient 
care, or imply that patients who seek those services are unworthy of care and attention. 
Hence, the failure of Catholic adoption agencies to serve gay couples is intrinsically 
objectionable in a public service provider, in ways that the refusal to provide contraception, 
sterilisation and abortion are not, in so far as those refused the latter are still eligible to 
receive other forms of care from the same provider.  
 Of course, what is troubling in the case of abortion, is that the failure to provide for it 
inevitably has a discriminatory impact, since only women can get pregnant, although both 
men and women may seek contraception and sterilisation. How troubling that discriminatory 
impact is depends on the context in which it occurs. Only women can get pregnant, and as the 
U.S Supreme Court minority insisted in Harris v. McRae
7
 – the decision to terminate or 
continue a pregnancy is dichotomous. To refuse a woman abortion, then, is to condemn her to 
continue her pregnancy. There are therefore practical and symbolic dimensions to a hospital’s 
failure to provide abortion that we need to consider. The practical one is relatively simple; if 
there are enough other places a woman can access abortion care, without additional expense, 
worry or trouble, there is no reason to suppose that the doctrinal denial of abortion coverage 
is unjust because of its consequences for sexual equality. Although only women are affected 
                                                          
6
 Compare the US Supreme Court decision in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, (1991), which held that the U.S. 
constitution does not require medical facilities, using public money or land, to inform women that they have a 
right to abortion, or when it might be medically advisable or necessary to exercise it.   
7 Harris v. McRae 448 U.S. 297, (1980), held that it was constitutional to deny women medically necessary 
(though not life-saving) abortions under the Medicaid programme’s funding for healthcare for the poor.  Its 
predecessor, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S., 464, (1977) held that there was no constitutionally guaranteed right to 
Medicaid funding for abortions that were not medically necessary.   
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by the failure to provide abortions, if that failure has no consequences for their access to 
abortion, there is no reason to reject it on practical grounds.  
 Abortion and maternity are dichotomous within a pregnancy in ways that matter 
symbolically, as well as practically. Hence, it is one thing for a hospital to cover maternity 
but not abortion coverage in a country, such as the UK, where the latter is not particularly 
controversial, and where the Catholic Church is not particularly powerful, and quite another 
in countries such as Ireland, or the United States, where the Church has consistently 
intervened in politics in order to prevent women’s access to abortion and contraception 
(Garrow, 1998, ch. 22). In such cases, the grant of an exemption means that the state appears 
to comfort and support one side in a very public struggle over the lives and rights of women – 
and will appear to side with the wrong side, if one cares about sexual equality. So what might 
be an acceptable political choice over the best way to fund public services in England, for 
example, would not be elsewhere, where considerations of sexual equality must more tightly 
constrain the provision of healthcare in such cases.
8
 
 If this analysis is persuasive, in countries such as the United States, democratic 
concerns for equality would require states to refuse Catholic hospitals exemptions for 
abortion, perhaps by denying Catholic hospitals the right to provide maternity care for the 
general public, in order to ensure that the full range of reproductive services is available to 
patients in one place, or by insisting that they partner with a provider who will provide 
appropriate coverage.
9
 In other circumstances, the fact that medical specialities, even within 
one hospital, are dispersed throughout a city, might mean that concerns for sexual equality, 
and for the quality and efficiency of care, can coexist with the coverage of abortion services 
by one medical provider and maternity services by another. Put simply, the geographical 
dispersion of medical facilities in many old cities, such as London, means that the image of 
one large, unitary hospital is often quite misleading. The geographical jumble of care, which 
can be so exasperating for patients and medical personnel, at least reminds us that the familiar 
picture of a hospital, providing comprehensive care in one place to all people, is often more 
fiction than reality. Where hospital care is dispersed in this way, the differences between 
                                                          
8
 By contrast, if socio-economic inequalities were much larger in England than in Ireland, moral considerations 
of equality might allow the latter greater scope for fee-paying care than the former.  
9
 Of course, you might say that there should be No catholic hospitals at all – but in the US context an ideal of 
comprehensive secular coverage is almost certainly impossible to achieve, given traditions and constitutional 
constraints.  
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religious and secular providers of medical care may be less noticeable than we sometimes 
assume, and therefore much less threatening to equality.
10
 
 There are good reasons why NHS medical centres and hospitals work hard to make 
patients and their families feel welcome, and to make it plain that they are open to people 
with different linguistic, cultural and ethnic backgrounds. The mere fact that these are 
statutory public services does not mean that people will feel entitled to use them, or feel that 
these services are for people like them. In so far as state provision of statutory services is 
perceived as open, non-discriminatory and helpful, then, this is an achievement bought with a 
great deal of hard work, openness to criticism and patience, rather than the inevitable 
corollary of state provision. Thus, the reasons to agree with the Humanist association on the 
importance of having statutory services provided in ways that support, rather than undermine, 
people’s sense of entitlement provides no reason to believe that religious provision must be 
inferior to secular provision.    
 However, I would be inclined to draw a distinction between primary and secondary 
education and other public services – although that is not to say that non-discriminatory 
provision of the former by religious organisations would therefore be objectionable. Once 
schooling becomes compulsory, we are not talking about a public service, which citizens may 
or may not use as needed, but an obligatory process which will dominate the formative years 
of all children – and, it should be said, of their parents. We should therefore question the 
second assumption of the Humanist Association’s argument – namely, that all statutory 
public services are morally and politically alike – even if we share, as I do, their concern with 
the subcontracting of state education to companies and religious associations in Britain in 
recent years (BHA: Appendix). These companies and religious bodies have been given a 
great deal of independence in their choice of curriculum, in their choice of personnel, and in 
the selection of students. However, the reasons for concern with these developments, and 
their implications for quality, equality and solidarity extend as much to secular as to religious 
organisations. Whoever provides primary and secondary education needs to do so in a way 
that is sensitive to the enormous power and influence involved, and the heavy responsibility 
not merely for the wellbeing of individual children, but for the domestic and foreign relations 
                                                          
10
 As a general matter, it is important to distinguish those requests for conscientious exemptions which are 
purely that, from those which – as with the Catholic and Evangelical Churches in America – are part of an 
organised political movement to impose doctrinally acceptable limits on democratic legislatures. The latter are, 
in good part, a power-play and responding to them adequately means considering how far, or whether, it is 
appropriate to take claims of conscience seriously in their case. 
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of the country. The constraints on government delegation of educational services are 
therefore much tighter in the case of schooling than in the case of other statutory services. 
 Transforming the Status Quo: Equality and the Creative Power of Politics 
 Finally, I would question the assumption that we should take the existing distribution 
of religious organisations as given, or assume that the state should choose the currently most 
competent, rather than trying to promote competence and its distribution amongst the 
population. The BHA is rightly concerned that if religious organisations are to be capable of 
competing with secular ones for the provision of statutory services, the United Kingdom will 
be dependent on only one or two organisations – the Salvation Army and Christian Aid 
(BHA: Appendix C). But why should governments take the power of existing religious 
associations as given, rather than seeking to encourage the formation or development of more 
egalitarian and more tolerant ones? (Lever, 2015, 1-15) And if we are concerned with unfair 
monopolies of power and privilege we cannot be indifferent to the way that our political 
representatives, and key parts of the political executive, judiciary and administration, are 
recruited and promoted either. Thus, the implicit contrast, assumed by the BHA, between a 
small group of socially and politically privileged believers and their associations, and a large 
group of socially diverse and politically representative ‘public officials’, is untenable, and 
remains question-begging even if we extend the comparison to include companies, like 
Capita, which seek government contracts for the provision of public services. In short, while 
it is right to worry about the way that public services are provided, and by whom, the force of 
these worries crosses, rather than maps, the secular/religious distinction.  
 Here it matters that statutory public services, interpreted empirically or normatively, 
are not equally difficult to provide, and differ in the extent to which they must be provided by 
one body, rather than by a coalition of different groups. It is not evident that if public services 
are contracted out, they must go to organisations that are already large. Granted, competence 
and experience matter – after all, these are services which are important, and which need to 
be provided properly. However, if we take seriously the idea that democracy requires people 
to develop the capacities to govern, not merely to elect those who govern, there is clearly 
considerable scope for broadening the range of people and organisations who can participate 
in providing even statutory public services, and for using the lure of government contracts to 
promote more egalitarian and tolerant religious associations (Lever, 2009: 223-227, 2013: 91-
106, and Lever, 2015: 13-15). 
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We can therefore share the BHA’s scepticism about the claims to special value or 
efficacy made on behalf of religious associations without supposing that religious 
organisations must be more sectarian or divisive than secular ones, and in need of some 
special justification which the latter lack. Any provider of statutory public services must be 
bound by antidiscrimination norms when serving the public. Hence, religious organisations 
are not entitled to exempt themselves from norms designed to protect the freedom, equality 
and solidarity of citizens, when they act on behalf of the state. 
 It does not follow that the state may not sometimes subsidise religious associations 
which provide non-statutory services to the public in ways that reflect their faith. Such 
subsidies are acceptable, as the BHA recognise, where adequate alternatives exist for those 
who cannot, or do not wish to, comply with any norms that are discriminatory.  Above all, the 
State may cease to fund organisations (whether secular or religious) which discriminate, in 
order to sustain those which (whether secular or religious) do not. There is therefore a much 
greater scope for political choice in the way that states can provide important public services 
than either Cardinal Dolan or the BHA assume.   
Conclusion 
Our societies are deeply marked by forms of prejudice, hostility and fear which democratic 
political rights have struggled to lessen but have, on occasion, been used to exploit. It is 
therefore important to be clear about the scope and grounds for action open to governments 
that seek actively to promote equality or which, as in the case of ‘Obama Care’, seek to 
improve the freedom and security of those who have languished without affordable 
healthcare for far too long. Faced with the difficulties of reconciling claims of conscience and 
equality, we have seen that there is more scope for political choice and invention than is often 
supposed. Existing differences between secular and religious associations are a poor guide to 
democratic morality and politics, being themselves an artefact of powers and privileges that 
we are duty-bound to remove. Hence, a commitment to democracy requires us to supplement 
an emphasis on what equality requires or forbids citizens and their governments to do, with 
attention to the scope for permissions which democratic principles and institutions create.  
Only in this way can we acknowledge the grip that the past has on the present, without 
succumbing to false claims of necessity (Unger, 1987). 
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